Summary: the candidates permitted to run to replace Ra’isi will give a strong indication of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s succession plans. A non-clerical president would make Khamenei’s son, Mujtaba, the most likely successor. There is no expected change in foreign policy.
In the early hours of 20 May 2024, Iranian state media confirmed that President Ra’isi and Foreign Minister Abdollahian were killed in a helicopter crash while travelling from the Azerbaijan border to Tabriz.
So far, there has been no reporting of any foul play, with pro-Iranian media not mentioning anything of the sort. This is risk positive, as Iran would have escalated considerably if it believed that its president had been killed by an outside actor.
Ra’isi as successor to Khamenei
The importance of Ra’isi was that he had a popular mandate, having won the election in 2021 (though that was largely because the pool of candidates was very limited). He was also in the judiciary, meaning that he could apply the law. And he was a sayyid, a descendent of the prophet of Islam. Recall that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had been president for two terms before becoming Supreme Leader. Ra’isi was being groomed to follow in his footsteps.
What changes, what doesn’t
The Iranian constitution stipulates that new elections be held in 50 days. This imposes a question on Khamenei. Does he try to find another candidate with a similar profile to succeed him? Or does he leave succession to the Assembly of Experts and what he would believe to be divine guidance?
For the foreign ministry, Abdollahian’s replacement will likely come from within the ranks of the foreign ministry. It is worth recalling that the Abdollahian and Ra’isi team had successfully re-established relations with a number of Arab countries, including most importantly Saudi Arabia. That said, the importance of Abdollahian should not be overemphasised - most famously, when former Foreign Minister Zarif tried to resign, the response from Khamene’i was that his role was to “implement” policy, that is, not formulate it.
Similarly, support for the Resistance Axis mostly goes through the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, not the cabinet. However, Ra’isi’s cabinet was unusual in that it backed the Resistance Axis much more openly than its predecessors. This likely reflects a change in the preferences of the leadership, and, remarkably, was combined with greater rapprochement with regional players. It is unlikely to change.
Under Ra’isi, the Iranian rial has continued to steadily lose value. This likely reflects a combination of sanctions and authorities’ tolerance for collapsing currency, and is unlikely to change.
That said, observe the GDP per capita on a PPP basis graph above. It crashed in 2011 after Obama imposed sanctions, recovered after the 2015 agreement, fell again, albeit less severely, when Trump withdrew from the agreement. Critically, it began to rise during President Trump’s last two years in office, meaning that Iran had found a way to avoid sanctions, and that this will continue under Ra’isi’s successor. This reduce the pressure on Iran to find a new agreement with the US.
Watch for
The candidate selection process, and who the Guardian Council allows to run. At this stage, it will become clear if there is an attempt to replace Ra’isi as candidate for the supreme leadership. Such a candidate would have to be a cleric and preferably a sayyid.
The inclusion - or exclusion - of candidates representing the Larijani and/or Rafsanjani camps in the list of approved candidates, or their appointment to senior roles. Khamenei had sidelined all the other power centres ahead of succession, including these two. Bringing them back in may have a destabilising effect, as they would seek to secure their positions against future exclusion. However, the leadership may view bringing them in favourably as a way of rebuilding consensus around a new candidate.
Ra’isi’s vice president running for the presidency. It would be difficult for the regime to exclude him and not to back him. However, given that he is not a cleric, doing so would narrow the potential candidates for supreme leadership after Khamenei. This would favour Khamenei’s son, Mujtaba, as successor.
'Or does he leave succession to the Assembly of Experts and what he would believe to be divine guidance?'
- Something does not sound right here. I would expect the supreme leader to be informed by facts provided by intelligence not by 'divine guidance.' You guys should know better.