Summary: The helicopter of Iranian President Ibrahim Ra’isi has apparently crashed near the border with Azerbaijan, triggering speculation of an Israeli assassination, due in part to Azerbaijan’s close ties with Israel. We are watching the commentary of Iranian media to see how they are treating this. So far, they are treating it as an “incident”, rather than accident, but they have not claimed foul play, nor have they made any allegations of foul play. Ra’isi’s importance stems from in large part from the fact that he fits the profile for a successor of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old.
Incident:
On 19 May, media reported that the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ibrahim Ra’isi had crashed in East Azerbaijan province during very adverse weather conditions, while en-route from Azerbaijan to Tabriz - the president was in Azerbaijan to attend the opening ceremony of the Qiz Qalasi Dam on the Aras River with his Azeri counterpart, Ilham Aliyev.
As of 1600 UK time, there is no news of deaths or survivors, as the helicopter has not been found due to fog, rain and difficult terrain. Iranian local media is reporting that drones and rescue teams are searching for the helicopter, and that rescue teams have not yet located the aircraft. The region of the crash is forested, sparsely inhabited, underdeveloped and mountainous. The plane was carrying the foreign minister, the minister of road works, the imam of the city of Tabriz, and other officials. The president was in a convoy of three helicopters, two of which continued to their destination.
We note that pro-Iran commentators on their state-linked media are describing this as an “incident”, not as an accident, nor as an attack or assassination. Their commentary on the topic will be extremely important to watch.
Why this matters:
Ra’isi, in addition to being the president of Iran, is a key contender for the succession of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old. Another major contender is Khamenei’s son, Mujtaba.
There is great suspicion within Iran over the role of Israel in trying to destabilise the Islamic Republic system of governance. The location - close to the Azeri border - and the timing - upon returning from Azerbaijan - is likely to raise suspicions of foul play. Azerbaijan is a close ally of Israel, and Israeli intelligence is quite active there in order to target Iran.
Scenarios:
Accident: The tragedy of the Middle East is summarised in this: even if it was an accident, not many people will believe. Some key players will act as if it was not. However, the adverse weather conditions make this a real possibility, and indeed, currently, the most likely one. Iran has a record of aviation accidents.
Assassination [attempt] - domestic: It is conceivable that this was a domestic affair, reflecting the intent of Mujtaba to remove intended to remove Ra’isi as a contender for succession. However, this appears unlikely, mainly because it is unnecessary. Mujtaba has enough domestic power - through the office of the Supreme Leader - and Ra’isi has no domestic powerbase outside of Khamenei. If Khamenei’s supporters, or Mujtaba, wanted Ra’isi not to be Supreme Leader, they would not need to assassinate him. If this was domestic, it is only Mujtaba who could have authorised this, in the hope of forcing his father’s hand in the issue of succession. This seems fanciful and speculative. We view this as the least likely scenario.
Assassination [attempt] - Israeli: The key issue here is that many in the Iranian leadership will assume that this is a high probability. There are several possibilities as to why Israel would do conduct such an attack:
To retaliate against Iran for its support for the Resistance Axis
To destabilise the succession to Khamenei
To instigate a political crisis in Iran
At this stage, this is nothing more than speculation. There is no reason as of yet to believe that this is an Israeli assassination.
Impact:
If the president is dead, his First Deputy, Mohammad Mokhber, would take over as president. New presidential elections would be held in 50 days. The Council of Guardians would exercise strict control over who is allowed to run, and the successor, if he is a cleric, would be a strong contender for the position of Supreme Leader. A non-cleric president would reduce the pool of candidates for succession to Khamenei.
If the president survives, his popularity will likely increase dramatically, as will his odds of succeeding the Supreme Leader.
A delayed period of time in which state authorities fail to report on the condition of the president would be highly embarrassing for the Islamic Republic. Not being able to find the president, even in adverse weather conditions and after an unexpected incident, would reflect very poorly on the authorities.
If Raisi dies and the Iranians believe that this was an accident, the main impact will be domestic. It will be difficult to find a cleric with suitable executive experience to succeed Khamenei, other than Mojtaba, or the current minister of intelligence, Esmaeil Khatib (even though he is a hojjat al-Islam, not an ayatollah, and lacks the clerical rank to be a wali al-faqih. That said, this may be a wise move, as it would help appease the clerical establishment in Najaf in Iraq and in Qom in Iran if the next Supreme Leader was focused on gaining his clerical credentials in his first few years in office, meaning that he would not immediately challenge them).
If this was a domestic assassination [attempt], it would reflect far more severe divisions and paranoia within the Iranian political system than is currently accepted. This would indicate that major bloodletting within Iran is likely in the run up to and after succession to Khamenei. The fear of being on the wrong side in the succession may paralyse the Iranian leadership, and it would make succession by Mojtaba far more likely. However, it would also indicate that Mojtaba’s position is far from secure even if he does become supreme leader.
If the Iranians claim that this was foul play by Israel, even if Ra’isi survives, it is difficult to see how they can avoid retaliating far more severely than in the 13-14 April attacks, up to and including launching a much bigger war.
Indicators to watch:
The key indicator to watch is Iranian state television and outlets aligned with it. If they begin reporting that this was foul play, then we are heading for major regional escalation.
Conversely, if Iranian media reports that this was an accident, it would mean that, most likely, this was indeed an accident, or that it was domestic foul play.
Public attacks by senior leaders on Mujtaba, or unusual high praise for him from public officials, would indicate that he is indeed preparing himself to succeed his father.
That the Iranians have not rushed to make accusations shows that they are not seeking immediate escalation. If that changes, we will treat that as an indicator and review our assessment.