Early on 19 April local time, Israel responded to Iran’s 350 munition 14 April attack by engaging in strikes in each of Syria, Iraq and Iran.
The Facts
News of the strike came from media, with Israel not yet commenting or claiming the attack. This is normal for Israel.
The Iranian Higher National Security Council has denied that there were strikes on Iranian territory from outside Iran, according to pro-Iran social media.
Iranian media and official sources had both said that Iranian air defence systems were activated near Isfahan and intercepted three unidentified objects.
Pro-Iran media is reporting that three drones launched from within Iran were intercepted. We are unable to give a view on the credibility of this claim.
As of 7 am UK time, pro-Iran media, which your unworthy scribe must listen to daily to atone for his sins, is still celebrating Iran’s 14 April strike and severely downplaying the Israeli strike.
It is unclear if this is due to instructions from above, or if these media are reporting on autopilot in downplaying the strike, in the same way that pro-Israel media was downplaying the Iranian strike.
The attack in Syria targeted a radar station. That radar cannot have been too effective, given almost weekly Israeli air strikes on Syria.
The attack in Baghdad reportedly targeted a meeting among IRGC officials and Iraqi militia leaders. Pro-Iranian and other regional media reporting on that strike has been minimal.
The IRGC had said that it would retaliate from Iran against Israeli strikes killing its officers anywhere in the region.
Media reports suggested that Israel has agreed to conduct a minimal strike on Iran, in exchange for Israel being given the US green light to conduct a major offensive in Rafah.
Pro-Resistance Axis commentators are saying, in our view, credibly, that there has been an Iranian decision to prevent the defeat of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
Israel - Hamas ceasefire negotiations are stalled, with little evidence of a breakthrough being likely.
Analysis
The most important strike was the one in Baghdad. By engaging in a minimal strike within Iran, while also likely killing senior IRGC officials in Iraq, Israel is sending a message that IRGC commanders can be targeted at will, anywhere in the region, while placing the onus of further escalation on Iran. This helps drive a wedge between the IRGC and Iran’s civilian leadership.
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was keen to emphasise that General Zahedi, who was killed in Israel’s attack on Iran’s Damascus consulate on 1 April, was keen on martyrdom and had sought it before he was killed. However, the killing of senior commanders still presents a real problem for the IRGC and their allies.
The IRGC is the key decision maker in Iran and the region, in partnership with Khamenei, the religious establishment and civilian authorities. IRGC influence will grow as Khamenei’s succession nears. It has a deep need to protect its own.
If it is seen by IRGC commanders that they can be killed at will, without a fight or consequences, this would very severely test the organisation’s cohesion and senior officers’ loyalty, before and especially after succession to Khamenei.
If there was a major strike on IRGC and Iraqi militia commanders in Baghdad, as early reports suggest, then the IRGC would have to respond and to show that the Iranian state was behind it.
The strike in Isfahan is intended to show Israel’s ability to penetrate deep into Iranian territory, though it appears that drones, not manned aircraft, were used.
As such, even though Israel showed that it can penetrate Iranian defences, this is a far cry from being able to launch large air attacks, which would require manned aircraft.
It is possible that Israel is showing that it can hit air defence systems with drones while following that up with more devastating strikes using manned aircraft, however, in that scenario, Iran would heavily target all Israeli air bases, making that not a viable option.
Israel still needs US involvement for airstrikes on Iran to have any meaningful impact. It is incapable of causing serious damage to Iran on its own.
The Rafah offensive is a challenge for Hezbollah and for the IRGC. We believe that they will escalate to prevent the defeat of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
Unlike Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas has been unable to impose a ceasefire on Israel.
Forecast
Further Iranian - Israeli escalation is likely if it is confirmed that IRGC commanders were killed in Baghdad, or that Israel launches a major offensive against Rafah.
Hezbollah - Israel escalation in south Lebanon is already underway, with the two sides engaging more in-depth targets and inflicting casualties at a higher rate. This escalation is unlikely to stop.
Iran can be drawn into the war to support both, Gaza Resistance Axis factions, as well as Hezbollah. Iran cannot afford a defeat for either. Therefore, escalation in Rafah and escalation in south Lebanon makes further exchanges of blows between Israel and Iran more likely.
As such, we stand by our forecast of 15 April, that the best-case scenario is for more rounds of escalation that fall below the threshold of all-out war.
Clients should not assume that this Israeli strike is the end of the matter. That would be severely short-termist.