Can Israel escape another defeat?
Israel has not won a war since 1982, and this round may be so much worse that the US is forced to step in.
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israeli civilians and soldiers in the environs of the Gaza Strip has forced Israel to accept the need for a ground invasion of Gaza. Indeed, Hamas has placed Israel in a position where only the recovery of captives – or their bodies – and the expulsion of Hamas from Gaza can be considered victory. If these objectives are not achieved, Hamas will keep building up its military capabilities. The 7 October offensives will become a template that can be repeated by Hamas, Hizbullah or West Bank militants, slowly forcing Jews out of the country by making it unsafe for them. Israel understands that this is existential. In conducting this attack, Hamas knew that it was imposing a ground offensive on Israel.
Ground nightmares
Let us begin with the obvious. If ground operations were a realistic option for Israel, it would have decisively won the 2006 Lebanon War against Hizbullah. Instead, Israel was unable to advance to Bint Jbeil, a small town 4km from the Israeli border. It even failed to fully capture Maroun al-Ras, a hamlet less than 2km from the border. If holding ground was a palatable option, Israel would not have withdrawn from Gaza in 2005, when Hamas was no more than an irritant. Israel would also not have allowed Hamas to remain active since 2006, despite fighting at least 12 campaigns against the group since then. Most recently, in July 2023, Israel used 1,000 troops operating under air cover to enter the Jenin refugee camp – its area is 0.15 square kilometres. The defending forces had just personal arms and explosives – no missiles and no anti-tank weapons. In 2014, Israel made its last ground incursion into Gaza, taking Shujaiyah, a 6 squared-kilometre densely populated neighbourhood outside Gaza City. Israeli forces suffered 13 killed and 56 wounded. Israel fired 4,800 shells in 7 hours, and up to 7,000 shells over four days, to capture this neighbourhood, much of which it turned into a “football field”. Israel allowed its artillery to land shells as close as 100 metres to its own soldiers – compared to the normal distance of 250 metres.
Ground wars are extremely tough when facing entrenched defenders, especially when they are well-equipped, as Hamas is. Witness the difficulties that Russia and Ukraine are facing to take mere towns and villages, let alone major cities. Modern weapons such as sniper rifles, drones and anti-tank missiles, combined with ancient techniques like digging tunnels and trenches, make it very hard for even technologically superior armies to advance.
Hamas’ layered traps
For context, Shujaiyah, which Israel managed to capture in 2014, is just 6 square kilometres. The densely built-up area of Gaza is close to 40 to 50 square kilometres – I’m excluding the less densely built-up areas. Notably, Hamas did not have drones during the Shujaiyah battle. As such, Israeli soldiers were able to seek refuge from their own artillery in their armoured vehicles. This time, with drones in operation, the ability to protect soldiers’ lives by using armour and artillery barrages will be severely reduced, as we have already seen Hamas destroy tanks using drones. In addition, in the remaining 300 square kilometres of the Gaza Strip, it is quite likely that Hamas has recreated Hizbullah’s “Nature Reserves”, that is, open areas with multiple tunnels, observation points and kill zones, that can be used very effectively in ambushes and that are fortified against airstrikes and artillery. To understand the importance of tunnels, it is worth recalling that even though Israel has been bombing Gaza regularly for a decade and a half, it still cannot stop Hamas from firing missiles at Tel Aviv. The missiles are hidden in tunnels and fired without Israel managing to stop them, even though its radar systems allow it to pinpoint the launch points and target them with airstrikes and artillery. Therefore, in urban combat, the tunnel network will be invaluable for Hamas. Air attacks do not solve this problem. Forces need to be able to go to the ground and take territory from their enemies, as we are seeing in Russia and Ukraine. But this will give Hamas the opportunity to capture more Israeli prisoners, as almost occurred in 2014, to which Israel will respond with artillery and aviation strikes intended to kill the captives rather than allow Hamas another bargaining chip. The impact this will have on soldiers’ morale is unimaginable.
Complicating Israel’s calculations further, Hamas will use its hostages expertly to demoralise Israeli troops, placing them in positions where they get killed by their compatriots. Its supporters and members in the West Bank and in Israel proper will launch continuous attacks against Jews, forcing Israel to spread its forces thin. And Hamas will also take advantage of the humanitarian disaster, which has already begun with Israel cutting off power, water and fuel from Gaza and preventing Egypt from sending aid. Hamas will use this in its media war against Israel, and Muslim societies and the Western left will side with Hamas.
Defeat or escalation?
There is no good outcome for Israel in all this. Israel has not decisively won a war against its enemies since 1982, when it expelled the Palestine Liberation Organisation from Lebanon to Tunisia. Since then, militant movements have engaged Israel in round after round of fighting, failing to achieve a decisive outcome, but succeeding in surviving and steadily learning and improving their capabilities. Israel’s population is too small to be able to subjugate six million Palestinians who are receiving support from other Muslim countries and communities. Israel has no strategic depth. And it is even more vulnerable to strikes from Hizbullah, the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces, Syria and other military forces led by Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. Those forces have far greater capabilities than Hamas and have said that they will not abandon it. They may be waiting for Israel to deplete its ammunition, materiel and manpower in an ineffective war against Gaza, and for its Iron Dome missile defence interceptors to run low, before joining the fight. What will the US do then? And, in the long run, what happens when Israel turns from being an asset that furthers US interests, to a liability that the US must fight to protect?