Chess vs Whac-a-Mole: Middle East War Update
The US' regional position is weakening as the war continues, but the US seems unwilling to force it to end.
First things first. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year. May the new year be better to you and your loved ones than the last one, and may it bring peace for all.
You may have missed the last few pieces from Modad Geopolitics, what with the holidays and all. Below is a quick update to help you keep up.
Executive Summary:
Iran and its allies are playing chess. The US and Israel are playing whac-a-mole.
Iran has managed to spin a web around Israel and the US where any US or Israeli action risks greater escalation that would cause more damage to shipping, to US military bases, to Israel, and to the US’ regional standing.
This aligns with Iran’s objective of forcing the US out of West Asia (the Levant and the Gulf).
Meanwhile, Israeli domestic politics ensure that it cannot end the war soon, and US domestic politics ensure that the US cannot bring Israel to heel. This guarantees continued brinksmanship and gradual escalation.
The war will end when Israel finds that the level of Israeli casualties and economic damage is unacceptable to the public, or when the cabinet collapses.
In Yemen, the campaign against Israeli-linked shipping will not stop. Any military intervention making attacks by Ansar Allah more likely to turn indiscriminate, and to target regional countries that host the US to force them to close US bases.
In Lebanon, Israel is threatening to expand its military actions, likely to force the US to act. Deterrence is holding, but fraying.
In Gaza, Israel is unable to achieve its declared objective.
In Iraq, the confrontation between the PMUs and the US is making it more likely that the Iraqi government would order the US out of the country.
The continued crisis is benefiting Iran, in that it is driving a deeper divide between the Muslim world and the US, and in that it is weakening the US’ regional standing and showing it to be a poor security guarantor.
Watch for
The US attacking Iranian military vessels in the Red Sea that are assisting the Houthi in their targeting, bringing about greater retaliation by Iran’s proxies.
The Iraqi PM being forced to expel the US from Iraq, making the US less interested in preserving its interests and in playing its hand carefully.
Israel declaring that its casualties are considerably higher than is being reported, bringing about an internal political crisis that distracts from the war but potentially helps end it.
Israeli strikes north of the Litani River in Lebanon, or Hezbollah strikes against Haifa or south of Haifa, indicating greater risk of all-out war.
Yemen
There has been a technological transformation that allows actors like the Houthi to assemble missiles and drones for USD5,000-USD25,000, which need to be stopped using USD2million missiles.
This gives the Houthi the ability to survive a lengthy fight with the US, given that the US will not produce cheap weapons under its current political economy.
The Houthi maritime siege on Israel, which has impacted shipping globally, will not end before the war in Gaza ends.
Modad Geopolitics had said that the US had no good options to stop Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement from targeting international shipping linked to Israel by ownership or destination (though it is not clear that the group always identified targets correctly).
Ansar Allah are trying to impose a choice - boycott Israel, or lose access to the Red Sea. China will side with Ansar Allah.
Ansar Allah’s official objective is not a ceasefire, but to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza. This gives them some room for manoeuvre.
The US, under the label of Operation Prosperity Guardian, is now threatening military action, and likely cannot back down unless Israel accepts a ceasefire.
Ansar Allah would likely retaliate to US attacks by targeting ships more indiscriminately, including by laying sea mines, and would attack US bases in Bahrain, Qatar and possibly other Gulf Arab countries.
Notably, Ansar Allah have not targeted any tankers as of yet, in part because it would destroy Yemen’s fishing industry. This may be a potential escalation avenue.
The risk to shipping would rise, especially as more and more ships are turning off their AIS transponders, according to maritime tracking websites.
This would place enormous pressure on the US to escalate against Iran. It would also pressure these countries to expel the US, in line with Iran’s objective of forcing the US out of the region.
The US’ reputation and regional influence are on the line. If the US cannot stop the Houthi, it loses its claim to be the guarantor of free maritime commerce, and it cannot claim to be a superpower.
Alternatively, if the US acts against Iran, this would reduce its ability to defend Taiwan, Ukraine and Israel, and would end as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. It would also make Iranian strikes against ships in the Strait of Hormuz more likely.
Lebanon
Israel is stuck in the north. Hezbollah has forced out tens of thousands of Israelis out of the north, and has shown that it is not deterred by Israel, and that it is able to engage in combat at will.
Israel remains mostly deterred in the north, but is under massive internal pressure to push Hezbollah away from the border, which, Modad Geopolitics argued, is as unrealistic now as it was in 2006.
Crucially, the Israeli defence minister, who has a tumultuous relationship with Netanyahu, appears eager for a military option. Any leaks from him that show Netanyahu as weak would undermine Netanyahu’s position within his own cabinet, encouraging its fracturing. Given Netanyahu’s political and legal troubles, remaining in his post is his own key priority. This makes him vulnerable to manipulation and manoeuvring by others.
The assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on 3 January is best understood in this context: Netanyahu approved the operation, knowing full well that it created a major risk of escalation, because of the pressures he faces, not because he is eager to side with his defence minister.
Israel is saying that it is seeking a diplomatic solution to push Hezbollah away from the border, after which it would use force. Hezbollah has no reason to give Israel a tactical advantage, however, or to release Israeli units that could deploy against Hamas in Gaza.
Hezbollah has been continuing with regular, daily, attacks against Israeli military positions, with some intended to show its ability to neutralise artillery units, or to detect new Israeli positions several kilometres from the border, or to strike at command centres.
The objective of these attacks is to keep Israel deployed along its northern border, but prevent escalation from spiralling out of control by showing the severe cost of a full-scale war.
Gaza
Modad Geopolitics highlighted Israel’s inability to control the territory that it captures largely due to the tunnel network, meaning that it cannot defeat Hamas’ insurgency and achieve its stated objective of eliminating Hamas.
Had Israel set itself the objective of weakening and damaging Hamas, it would have won. Given the high objective it set, Israel will fail. Hamas will not be destroyed, but will recover and become more effective, in part because Egypt does not want Israel to win decisively.
Israel is unable to fulfil its declared objective of expelling the Palestinians, which guarantees the continuation of future rounds of war that may be more devastating than this one.
Israel is as of yet unwilling to agree to a ceasefire, given that such a ceasefire will be declared a victory by Hamas.
Only escalating Israeli casualties will change Israel’s thinking.
If military casualties go above 362, which is the number of soldiers, police and rescue personnel killed on 7 October, this may force the cabinet to reconsider its ground operation, bringing about a ceasefire.
The current official casualty toll from the ground operation is 182.
Iraq
Pro-Iran factions are pressuring Prime Minister Sudani to force US forces out of Iraq.
This is Iran’s main priority - a withdrawal from Iraq would make the US’ position in Syria untenable, and would show Gulf Arab states that the US was not committed to their security.
Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) are conducting regular attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria. These have not inflicted casualties so far. The US has responded with attacks that did inflict casualties.
The problem the US faces is that these PMUs are formally part of the Iraqi state. When the US retaliates, it is killing government security officials, placing it on a collision course with the Iraqi state qua state.
This is precisely Iran’s objective. It wants the Iraqi government to order the US out of the country.
Iran
The US reportedly asked Iran to mediate and have its allies and proxies calm down the situation - to stop the fire from spreading.
Iran responded by saying it was not the US’s firefighter, and that if the US wanted to halt the spread of the fire, then it must impose a ceasefire on Israel.
Iran, and the Resistance Axis, have kept insisting that the Resistance Axis components act independently, and are not subject to Iranian orders.
This is intended to exonerate Iran from its proxies’ actions and keep it out of the fight, to help Iran’s allies in their domestic affairs, and to retain the ability to pressure Israel, helping bring about a ceasefire but also risking regional escalation.
Iran deployed a frigate to support a spy-ship which is deployed to assist the Houthi in their targeting. The US may well see these vessels as legitimate targets.
On 3 January, two bombs targeted a commemoration for assassinated Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, killing 103 people. Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi was set to speak, and Soleimani’s successor, Ismai’l Qa’ani, was present. One of them may have been the target. Iran will certainly see this as an Israeli or US attack, but will likely not retaliate directly in the near future.
Israeli domestic politics
When the war ends, Netanyahu will face fresh elections, including probably for the leadership of the Likud Party. This may end his political career, and also expose him to investigations by his personal enemies within the judiciary that may lead to his arrest.
The judiciary chose to reverse Netanyahu’s judicial reform, which, contrary to the popular narrative, make Israel more democratic, not less, but make it less republican, in that they reduce the ability of the judiciary to reverse the will of the public as expressed in the Israeli parliament.
Netanyahu’s domestic rivals, including his defence minister, Yuav Gallant, are working on undermining him. Netanyahu’s chief electoral rival, Benny Gantz, had joined the war cabinet after the 7 October attacks, and is now preparing for the day after the war and the possibility of the cabinet’s collapse.
Netanyahu is also under threat from his right wing partners, who are threatening to resign if Netanyahu agrees to ceasefires or does not act with what they deem to be enough force in Gaza and Lebanon.
This impasse forces Netanyahu to continue the war until he can be seen to achieve something. What, though, is unclear. The war is therefore going to continue until the level of casualties and economic damage faced by Israel force its end, or until the cabinet collapses and someone else with realistic objectives takes over.