Iran’s game changing capabilities
In Yemen and in Ukraine, Iran demonstrated new military and industrial capabilities that require a rethink of the impact of the next war on Israel.
Commercial Takeaway: Israel’s desalination and power plants, ports, airports, chemical industries and possibly its microchip industries would be hit in a war with Hizbullah and other Iranian allies and proxies in the “Resistance Axis”. Such a war would aim at inflicting a defeat on Israel and weakening the US in the region, accepting the risk that it would intervene directly. Modad Geopolitics assesses that such a war is likely in the coming years if not months, depending on Iran’s own assessment of its level of preparedness.
Analysis:
Hizbullah, which leads the Arab components of the pro-Iran Resistance Axis, believes that the US is engaged in an economic war against Lebanon. It believes that Lebanon faces two options: continued economic decline leading to civil war, or a regional war with Israel, after which Iraq and Lebanon would be forced to fully join Syria and Iran in the Chinese – Russian – Iranian axis, paving the way for state-building projects aligned with Iranian interests in both countries. It is not certain that Hizbullah has made the decision to go to war, but, in my view, it likely has, or it soon will, if there is no major aid package given to rescue Lebanon economically, which is very unlikely. Furthermore, Hamas and Iran are of a similar mind, for different reasons. They believe that Israel is seeking to decisively transform al-Aqsa Mosque/the Temple Mount, with a view to “Judaising” it and either reducing Muslims’ access or forcing them to share it with Jewish worshippers. This is a decisive issue for Muslims, and a bold red line.
This piece examines what may happen if Hizbullah and other Iran allies did decide to go to war with full Iranian backing, albeit not with Iranian direct participation.
Iranian capabilities:
There is no publicly available information about Iran’s military manufacturing capacity. However, Iran has demonstrated during the eight years of war in Yemen that it can supply its allies, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement, with a steady stream of ballistic missiles, drones and other equipment.
This allowed Ansar Allah to push first the UAE and then Saudi Arabia out of direct involvement in the Yemeni conflict. Yemen was seen by the Saudis as their backyard. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s exit from the war represented a strategic defeat.
Critically, Yemen provided an arena in which Iran could test and perfect its missile and drone technology against American air defence equipment.
During the ongoing Russian Ukrainian war, Iran is demonstrating that it can provide a steady supply of Shahed 136 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, and that these UAVs have high accuracy and capability. It is evident that Iran can obtain components from abroad, mix them with domestic components, and build a good pipeline of reliable weapons.
Furthermore, it would be somewhat absurd for Iran to supply Yemen or Russia with such equipment if it were not producing greater volumes at higher quality for its own use, and for Hizbullah, which is far more integral to Iranian interests.
Moreover, in 2018 and 2019, Iran attacked international shipping and global energy security, by attacking ships in the Arabian Sea and striking at ARAMCO’s critical Abqaiq installation. Iran knew at the time that it was risking a direct war with the US, as energy security and the safety of international shipping are traditional US red lines. Iran would not have done so had it not assessed that it could at least survive a war against the US, and that risking such a war was worthwhile.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that Iran has adequate volumes of, and production capacity for, cruise, anti-ship and ballistic missiles, which it regularly tests and improves. It is also reasonable to assume that Iran has deployed such weapons in Syria and in Iraq, as well as in Lebanon and Yemen, with final operational control resting in the hands of the IRGC.
Furthermore, Iran has successfully targeted Israeli ships underway, that is, in motion. We can assume that such anti-shipping capabilities have been transferred to the Houthi and to Hizbullah. While Israeli naval vessels have countermeasures, these may well prove to be insufficient against combined attacks using aerial drones as well as anti-ship missiles, which Hizbullah is almost certainly planning.
Targeting and tactics:
Given the above, Modad Geopolitics assesses that, in a war with Israel, Hizbullah would not limit its offensive operations to Lebanon. Rather, it would launch missiles from throughout the region, in partnership with its allies in the Resistance Axis.
The Houthi would target shipping headed to Israel as well as firing long range rockets at Eilat.
Hizbullah would fire anti-ship missiles at Israeli shipping headed to Haifa, and possibly Ashdod. Hizbullah would also attack offshore energy infrastructure in northern Israel.
Hizbullah and Hamas would seek to overwhelm and paralyse Israeli air defence systems (Iron Dome) from Gaza and Lebanon by launching thousands of rockets from Lebanon and hundreds from Gaza every day.
Hizbullah would use its missile inventory that has been upgraded with guidance kits. This upgrade not only makes missiles accurate, but it also would require Israel to use more interceptors than it would have had to use against unguided missiles, as many unguided missiles would have simply fallen in open spaces.
Hizbullah, operating out of Syria and Lebanon, would also attempt to target Israeli air defence systems with drones and missiles, with a view towards disabling both radars and launchers.
Cruise missiles with ranges of up to 1350 km would be fired by pro-Hizbullah, IRGC-led factions in Syria and Iraq. These missiles would traverse Jordanian airspace, against which Israel has much fewer air defences. They would firstly target Israeli military airports, then bases, then other critical infrastructure, both civilian and military.
Hizbullah’s elite units in southern Lebanon would attempt to cross the border at several locations, in a bid to force Israel to focus on defending its own territory, creating openings for continued missile strikes from farther afield.
Israel’s main weakness is its lack of strategic depth. Iranian missile tests so far suggest that Iran is now able to target what little depth Israel has from anywhere in the region, in adequate volumes to potentially disable its key military assets, that is, the air force and missile defence systems. Israel’s air defence systems are technologically impressive but may be overwhelmed by Hizbullah alone, using only the massive volume of missiles that it can fire. In turn, the overwhelming of missile defence systems would enable Israel’s enemies to strike at its critical civilian and military infrastructure. This is a potential game changer.
Commercial Impact
The impact on Israel of such a war, were it to break out, would include:
Cutting off power in Israel, probably for days if not weeks, due to high precision attacks on power stations.
Reducing the supply of potable water in Israel due to the targeting of desalination plants.
Shutting down Israeli civilian aviation for the duration of hostilities due to the targeting of airports.
Suspending Israeli port operations out of Haifa, and possibly Ashdod and Ashkelon, due to the use of anti-ship missiles by Hizbullah and due to missile attacks against Israeli ports.
Reducing shipping between Asia and Israel due to Houthi anti-shipping attacks in the Red Sea.
Destroying some Israeli weapons depots, leading to extensive collateral damage.
Damaging Israel’s industrial base, especially chemicals, electronics, superconductors, microchips and the like, due to direct targeting with ballistic and cruise missiles.
Rioting across Israel, with arson, looting and damage to property, as the Arab population rises up to attack the Jewish population.
Major protests and riots in the West Bank and in Israeli 1948 territories by Palestinians, targeting police stations and Israeli civilians, both armed and unarmed.
Severe casualties among Israeli civilians.
The regional impact would include:
Increased risk of attacks against US bases in Iraq and Syria, with the objective of pinning the US down and eventually forcing it out.
A de-facto siege against some US bases in Iraq and Syria, to cut off their supply and force the US to focus on rescue operations for its troops, rather than assisting Israel.
Increased risk of attacks against US bases in the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, and against these countries’ energy infrastructure, with the aim of forcing them to deny the US use of their territories.
Increased risks to Red Sea shipping due to Houthi anti-shipping attacks.
The main risk that this scenario carries for the Iran-led axis is that it would bring the US fully into the war, as discussed here. Direct US involvement would risk Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al Mandab. That in turn would be cataclysmic for the global economy, as it teeters on the edge of a banking crisis and is still suffering the repercussions of the energy crisis instigated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ensuing sanctions. A major game changer would be for Iran to announce that it has nuclear weapons, which it would have obtained using North Korean designs and indigenous capabilities.
That said, Gulf Arab states may well turn against the US during such a conflict, for example, denying the use of their airspace to the US, or preventing US aircraft on their territory from operating in support of Israel.
This would be the logical result of firstly, the Saudi – Iran and UAE – Iran normalisation agreements, secondly, of China’s ability to offer security guarantees to these countries, and, finally, of the US’ failure to enforce its red lines against Iran and to defend Gulf countries against Iranian-sponsored attacks on their energy and aviation infrastructure and against international shipping.