Victory and Defeat
What victory and defeat may look like for each of Israel and Hamas, and the obstacles to achieving them. Part I, Israel.
Ed: There is a follow up to this piece describing Hamas’ conditions for victory, which you can read here.
With Joe Biden’s visit, and his combination of total support for Israel and insistence on allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza – contrary to Israel’s wishes – it has become easier to define victory for Israel.
Objective
Israel will attempt to enter large urban areas in northern Gaza, including Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, the Jabaliya refugee camp and, especially, Gaza City. This aligns with Israel’s evacuation order given to civilians, attempting to force them to head south of the river Wadi Gaza. Success in this objective would reduce the risks to Ashkelon and Sderot, which Israel has had to evacuate. Israel will likely combine such an operation with increasing its control over rural areas in southern Gaza, to create a buffer for the dispersed Israeli settlements opposite southern Gaza. The only alternative is for Israel to continue with a punitive campaign of destruction without entering Gaza, and then agreeing a ceasefire while claiming to have restored deterrence. Of course, this is political suicide, as Hamas is almost certain to attack Israel again shortly after the end of the war to show that Israel has failed and exacerbate Israel’s political crises.
Tactics
There is some manoeuvre space for armour in the vicinity of these urban areas, which Israel will seek to exploit. It will likely attempt gradual, multi-pronged attacks, attempting to use a combination of surveillance, armed and suicide unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating ahead of Caterpillar D9 bulldozers, backed by armoured vehicles, tanks, helicopters, artillery and fixed-wing aviation. Israel will pave the way for such offensives with intensive aerial bombardment, aimed at pushing civilians to leave and showing Gazans and Hamas the price of attacking Israel again.
Complications
Below are some considerations that may prevent Israel of preventing Israel from attaining its objective of at least taking Gaza City and urban areas north of it. As I think about this list, it appears clear that Israel is a status quo power with no true path to victory.
Low casualty tolerance. As of the time of this writing, Israel has lost 306 soldiers since 7 October. In comparison, Israel lost nearly a thousand soldiers in the 1967 Six Day War, 3,000 in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 650 during the 4-month 1982 invasion of Lebanon and just 121 soldiers during the 33-day 2006 Second Lebanon War, which was considered a game-changing Israeli defeat.
Sense of insecurity. Anything other than a clear and decisive victory, which may be unattainable, would demonstrate that Israel is unable to protect Jewish citizens. Furthermore, Israel has had to evacuate settlements in the north and south, including the cities of Ashkelon and Sderot. These evacuations may have to expand further. This is precisely Hamas’ and the Resistance Axis’ intent. Through their military activities, they aim to convince at least some Jews to leave Israel or not migrate there, undermining the narrative that Israel is a safe haven for Jews. In turn, this may force the Israeli command to keep pushing even when it does not make military or political sense.
Internal divisions. The war cabinet includes PM Netanyahu and two of his key rivals. Furthermore, the PM failed to form a wider national unity cabinet, leading to a huge risk that any failures would generate additional dissent. This in turn would bring politics into military decision making.
Low tolerance for war and mobilisation costs. Israel has mobilised 360,000 personnel from its reserves. This is 8% of Israel’s labour force. No country can afford to maintain this mobilisation for an extended period while also maintaining a normal civilian economy. Additionally, the West Bank paralysed by insurgency, many localities had to be evacuated and much of the economy is suffering frequent stoppages due to rocket fire. Last, this conflict kills Israel’s tourism industry, raises pressure on the currency and reduces foreign investment. The Resistance Axis is not concerned with its economies, however. Israel’s “selling point” is that it can offer a first world living standard for Westernised Jews who often have foreign passports. This war risks making that claim doubtful.
Prisoners. Palestinian factions have captured at least 200 Israelis, including soldiers and civilians. They want to negotiate the release of thousands of prisoners held by Israel. As Israel proceeds with its campaign, it risks killing many of its prisoners. Hamas will exploit this in its media, leading to a significant internal political backlash for Israel.
External pressure due to Palestinian casualties. Israel’s casualties from the 7 October attack are around 1,400-1,500. Typically, the Arabs lose five to twenty times as many casualties as the Israelis. This reflects Israel’s belief in disproportionate response, which is driven by Israel’s demographic fears, dependence on a costly reservist army, and need to maintain deterrence. As Gaza casualties rise – they are between 3,000 and 4,000 at the time of this writing – pressure on Israel to end the campaign will increase. Furthermore, with Israel seeking to displace a million Gazans, the aid needs of the Gazan population will be severe. This will eventually generate external pressure on Israel to halt its operation.
Tunnels, so many tunnels. Israel claimed to have destroyed 100km of Hamas tunnels in 2021. It is more likely that Israel discovered the presence of 100km of tunnels, which was first reported in 2015, in reference to an alleged 100km of tunnels discovered in the 2014 Gaza War. No one really knows what tunnels are in Gaza, but, from the fact that Israel has been unable to halt missile fire using airstrikes, it appears obvious that some of these structures are immune to detection, airstrikes and/or artillery.
New Hamas capabilities. Already, Hamas has attempted to attack an offshore gas platform off the Israeli coast. There are very likely new capabilities, ranging from drones, precise rockets, better anti-tank armour, and rocket attacks targeting tanks and the infantry escorting them. During this writing, media revealed that there were still Palestinian militants in southern Israel, and a gunfight took place in Sderot.
Dispersed forces. Israeli soldiers are already deployed to the Lebanese border, fearing Hizbullah’s possible entry into the war, and to the West Bank, where the insurgency is expanding. This prevents Israel from fully concentrating its forces against Gaza.
New fronts. Hizbullah is almost certain to enter the war if it assessed that Hamas was on the cusp of a decisive defeat.