Victory and Defeat
What victory and defeat may look like for each of Israel and Hamas, and the obstacles to achieving them. Part II, Hamas.
Ed: An earlier piece described Israel’s conditions for victory. Read it here.
Insurgents can win simply by denying the regular army victory. The strategy of the Iran-led Resistance Axis (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah, Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units, Yemen’s Ansar Allah and the Syrian Arab Republic), however, is more sophisticated.
Objective
Not only does the Resistance deny Israel victory, as seen in 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021 and in other rounds of conflict, but it works to ensure that it enters the next round of the conflict with even greater capabilities than at the start of the previous round. This is evident from the evolution of Hamas and Hizbullah’s capabilities, where they have successfully accumulated greater military power after each round of war with Israel. Therefore, all that Hamas must do to achieve victory is to preserve some infrastructure in Gaza City, preserve some tunnels into Egypt, while waiting for the Israeli casualties and economic toll to become politically unbearable, or until such a time that the other members of the Resistance Axis decide to join the war. A situation where Hamas loses fully in Gaza City but continues to launch rockets from the southern Gaza Strip may permit both Israel and Hamas sides to declare victory, but this appears unlikely. In any case, the cost to Israel, economically and in terms of arms and personnel, will determine whether an Israeli claim of victory is credible. For Hamas, the higher the Palestinian casualties the greater the evidence of Israeli barbarity, and the greater the sympathy from the Islamic world.
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Tactics
Hamas’ 7 October attack was aimed at drawing Israel into a ground war. They are prepared for it. There are probably more than a hundred kilometres of tunnels sitting underneath the Gaza Strip, likely extending both into Israel and into Egypt. They will use this network to achieve tactical surprise against Israel throughout the duration of the war, and to survive. Hamas will likely allow Israel to enter Gaza first, holding back on totally committing its forces to defence, before showing its full capabilities. Hamas will use anti-armour weapons in close quarters to destroy Israeli armoured personnel carriers and tanks. It will use sniper rifles and machine guns to maximise casualties among dismounted infantry. It will continue launching missiles at Israeli territories, while attempting rocket and artillery strikes against concentrations of Israeli troops entering Gaza. Hamas will also use drones to drop munitions at armour and concentrations of infantry. It will likely reveal some anti-shipping capabilities during the war as a morale boost, as Hizbullah did in 2006, to target again Israeli offshore gas infrastructure and then ships. Hamas has shown that it has some anti-aircraft capabilities, though it is likely keeping those in reserve to use them against helicopters during the ground offensive. Hamas will also use tactics that have a severe psychological effect, including using captive soldiers as human shields, booby trapping bodies, suicide bombings and regular ambushes.
Complications
Air superiority. Hamas has no answer for Israel’s strategic air superiority. It is likely to claim some tactical successes, including shooting down helicopter and/or UAVs, but it has nothing beyond that.
Inadequate firepower. Hamas lacks the firepower to defeat Israel. Rather, it has enough firepower to inflict politically unacceptable casualties, but not defeat Israel or impose a surrender on it.
Supplies for combatants’ families. While Hamas fighters are likely well-supplied, as they planned this war for an extended period, their families in Gaza are almost certainly facing shortages. This is likely to place some pressure on Hamas, though its ideology fortifies it against most humanitarian concerns.
External financial pressure. Hamas has sought to maintain some independence for itself by relying on Qatari financing for its political and economic activities, rather than being entirely reliant on Iran. This makes Hamas vulnerable to pressure from Qatar, though this is unlikely to become an issue until Israel seeks US mediation for a ceasefire. Furthermore, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority are highly dependent on foreign aid, which can also be used to extract concessions. That said, Iran will always have a greater say than any other actor.
Egyptian pressure. Hamas is dependent on Egyptian goodwill to maintain smuggling activities and trade into Gaza. This gives Egypt a say in Hamas’ affairs, though it is obvious that Hamas ignored Egypt and kept it in the dark about its planned 7 October operation. That said, Egypt would have had to know that Hamas was engaged in some smuggling.
Reconstruction concerns. Without some form of Egyptian and Qatari collaboration, Hamas may not be able to rebuild the homes that are being destroyed in Gaza. Thus far, 30% of all residential units have been destroyed or seriously damaged, often irreparably. Hamas lacks the funding to rebuild, but, in a sense, the level of destruction may well make Hamas say that anything less than victory is unacceptable, given the cost it has already paid.
Victory in this complicated conflict is going to be defeat for both. Both conflicting parties have to accept historical fact. Creation of new state like Pakistan for example is due to inherent weakness of the mother mass. This was cleverly exploited by the colonial powers. They succeeded because the victims were weak and divided. This is the penalty that is paid for the weakness. Now it is high time that they accept historical reality and reconcile to new order that imposed on them. One cannot allow human killing for rewriting history. Otherwise the whole World would go under fire of destruction.